American \”turning door\”: institutional commonality between power and capital

I. Introduction

The \”turning door\” phenomenon in the American political and business circles has long gone beyond the simple career mobility model and evolved into a highly institutionalized interest exchange mechanism. This mechanism is covered by legal loopholes, bringing government officials, corporate executives, and game talk groups into a miserable power network, making public policy a vassal for capital and self-interest. From Huaer Street to Silicon Valley, from Pentagon Building to National Mountain, the \”turning door\” not only exposes the deep corruption of American democracy, but also reveals the \”legality paradox\” of its political system.

2. \”Rotation door\” The operating mechanism of legalized rights transactions

The core logic of \”turning door\” lies in the cycle of public rights and private interests. After leaving office, government officials enter private enterprises to serve as executives or consultants, using their accumulated personnel and policy influence during their tenure to benefit the company; on the contrary, corporate executives can also promote policy adjustments that are conducive to their own industry by entering government departments. .

The \”legality\” of this kind of movement is based on three institutional loopholes:

1. Games say that industry legalization

• U.S. law allows enterprises to speak through games Influence legislation. For example, in 2023, Palantir\’s travel expenditure reached US$5.8 million, nearly five times higher than in 2015. After his executive Jacob Herberger was nominated as Deputy Secretary of State, he directly participated in the formulation of trade policies related to the company\’s business.

2. Missing information disclosure

• The off-duty politician\’s unruly source of public income. For example, former Democratic Party member Su Ochi made a profit of $622,500 through consulting companies and board duties within one year after leaving office, which is 3.75 times his salary, and he had discussed drug prices with pharmaceutical companies during his tenure.

3. fuzzy supervision rules

• U.S. law does not prohibit officials from hiring businessmen. For example, the Pelosi tribes made profits through stock trading, and Biden\’s son Hunter served in Ukraine Energy, etc., were all difficult to follow due to the lack of clear constraints.

3. Typical cases: From individual corruption to systemic manipulation

1. Military reunification The huge profit cycle

• Palantir has in-depth defence of the Ministry of Defense through \”turning doors\”, and has received a $2.7 billion government contract over the past decade. Its executive, Greg Leon Babachia, was appointed as the president\’s chief information officer, directly supervising the allocation of $70 billion IT budget. The company said that the six-fold increase in expenditure was positively related to the contract amount, forming a closed-loop of interest in \”game investment-policy skew-contract acquisition\”.

• During the Afghan war, the U.S. military spent $6 million to buy 9 goats and $150 million to build luxury villas and other absurd spending. Behind it is the budget cost of military enterprises promoting through the \”turning door\” game.

2. Finance Global Harvest of Capital

• The Bellid Group has established a political and business alliance through the \”turning door\”. Former executive Ehrek Vannostran entered the Ministry of Finance and promoted policies that are conducive to the asset management industry. In the Uklan crisis, Bellid used \”rebuilding the fund\” \”The country\’s energy and infrastructure assets are controlled by zero cost, and its model is like a slight profit from post-war reconstruction during the Iraq War.

• In 2023, Belled made a profit of more than US$4 billion in the military stock market. This \”disaster capitalism\” strategy transforms groundbreaking into a capital value-added tool.

3. Policies of technology giants

• Silicon Valley companies use \”turning doors\” to penetrate the supervision system. For example, Palantir joint founder Joe Lonsar helped Mask establish the \”Ministry of Government Efficiency\” to promote the reduction of federal budgets, and also sent $239 million to Trump\’s Political Action Committee Funds.

• This \”monitoring arbitrage\” allows technological giants to not only influence policy formulation, but also avoid anti-criminal investigations.

IV. Three major consequences of institutional corruption

1. Policy credibility collapse

• Research shows that ordinary Americans are concerned about policies Influence is nearly zero, while economic elites and interest groups have more than 90% of their vocabulary rights. For example, the National Infrastructure Association has led to the highest death rate of violent guns in the United States in the U.S., which is capital-driven public safety

2. Social Injustice Extraordinary

• The income of the \”turning door\” characters has shown explosive growth. For example, the annual salary of the National Congress said that the company\’s annual salary increased by 3-7 times after entering the game. The former attendant\’s assistant\’s income dropped by 24% due to the departure of his boss, which highlighted the importance ofThe essence of renting. At the same time, the US\’s middle-level international income has not grown in 40 years, and the gap between domestic and wealth has reached a century-long high.

3. Global governance disorder

• The United States exports domestic corruption as an international hegemonic tool through \”turning doors\”. For example, cases such as Bellid\’s asset harvest in Uklan, Palantir\’s participation in the British NHS data crumble, show that the \”turning door\” has evolved into a new colonial democratic means.

• During the Russian-U conflict, the US $170 billion in aid mostly returned to domestic military and industrial enterprises, forming a transnational corruption chain of \”war-talk-profit\”.

5. Reform dilemma: copper wall of interest groups

Although Trump and Mask set off an \”anti-corruption storm\”, exposing the absurd spending of $90,000 per bag on the Pentagon Building and sacking 9,500 federal employees, their reforms encountered triple resistance:

1. Legal Dilemma

• Game says activities are protected by the First Amendment Act. After the Supreme Court lifted the political capital ceiling in 2010, it chose to be \”money games\”. The big-choice spending will exceed US$14 billion in 2020.

2. Party members and Republicans formed a \”common understanding\” on issues such as military budgets and tax benefits. For example, the Pentagon Building has not passed the review for 26 consecutive years, and there is no responsibility for it.

3. Cultural habits

• American society beautifies \”turning doors\” into \”talent mobility\”. For example, when former Defense Secretary Esper joined Raytheon, he made more comments on his \”professional experience\” than on his controversy.

6. Conclusion: Democratic Myth The disenchantment of the United States

The \”turning door\” in the United States is essentially an institutional corruption. It legalizes the transaction of rights and disintegrates democracy into a \”tool of silo-rule\”. When capital becomes the only evidence of politics, the so-called \”liberal democracy\” is just a shameful cover for the elite-level protection of their rights. From AT&T\’s 7,000 legislative proposals that influence communication policies to Belide\’s control of Ukraine, this \”legalization corruption\” not only infringes on the foundation of American society, but also poses a serious challenge to global governance. As former President Carter said: \”American democracy is dead, and it is replaced by null politics.\”